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Wise and Darst: Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I.

RIGHTS OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY

Craigo v. Marshall, 331 S.E.2d 510 (W. Va. 1985).
Cronauer v. State, 322 S.E.2d 862 (W. Va. 1984).
2
In two unrelated decisions, Craigo v. Marshall' and Cronauer v. State the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed several issues which will affect
the rights of persons already in custody. The court explained the requirements for
3
issuance of a valid rendition warrant in connection with extradition proceedings,
clarified the statutory mandate of appointing a committee to protect the interests
of incarcerated persons 4 and set parameters upon the discretion of trial judges
to determine when a prisoner may appear at trial.' Through its holdings, the court
stressed the need for maintaining prompt, fair administration of justice to protect
the rights of incarcerated persons.

Craigo v. Marshall6 was one of two consolidated cases that involved the same
legal issue of whether a prisoner may file a civil action without having a committee
appointed. The petitioners, David Carr and Robert Craigo, were each serving
7
sentences in excess of one year in the State Penitentiary in Moundsville. In 1984,
both filed separate, unrelated civil actions in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County,
and the trial court, sua sponte, dismissed both actions citing statutory authority
as interpreted in Waynesboro v. Lopinski3
The correctional and penal statutes authorize the appointment of a committee
on the motion of an interested party when a person "is confined in the penitentiary
•..for one year or more . . . . ''9 It is further provided that a committee may
sue and be sued on behalf of a convict for all causes of action which he might
sue or be sued upon if he had not been incarcerated.'"
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals overruled a prior decision in Waynesboro v. Lopinski where the court
had stated that "prisoner under penitentiary sentence of one year or more must
sue or be sued through a duly qualified committee."'" The court found this interpretation to be overly protective and restrictive of the civil rights of an incarcerated
person. It ruled that a prisoner may file a civil action without having a committee

2

Craigo v. Marshall, 331 S.E.2d 510 (W. Va. 1985).
Cronauer v. State, 322 S.E.2d 862 (W. Va. 1984).
Id.at 866-68.
Craigo, 331 S.E.2d at 512.

Id. at 515.
Craigo, 331 S.E.2d 510.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 511-12; Waynesboro v. Lopinski, 116 W. Va. 551, 182 S.E. 283 (1935) (citing W. VA.
CODE § 28-5-33 (1931)); W. VA. CODE § 28-5-36 (1980).
W. VA. CODE, § 28-5-33 (Supp. 1985).
'0 W. VA. CODE, § 28-5-36 (1980).
" Waynesboro, 116 W. Va. at 551, 182 S.E. 283 (syllabus point one) (emphasis added).
6
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appointed pursuant to the statute and without using a next friend pursuant to Rule
17(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure."
In reaching its decision the court found support in public policy specifically
recognizing the difficulty a prisoner faces in securing the appointment of a committee prior to the applicable statute of limitations. There is no tolling provision
in the West Virginia statute of limitations with regard to a prisoner's claim during
the period of his imprisonment. The court reasoned that, unless a prisoner is able
to bring suit while imprisoned, he could lose his cause of action.' 3 This ruling,
in essence, allows a prisoner to effectively waive his right to the appointment of
a committee if he desires to initiate a civil action in his own name." When a prisoner
is a defendant in a civil suit, however, there must be an express written waiver
of his right to a committee or a guardian ad litem, or such suit cannot be directly
maintained against him. Public policy supports this distinction because, as a defendant, the prisoner has not voluntarily elected to come into court."
The court next addressed the issue of when a prisoner may personally appear
at trial. Recognizing that the right to appear at trial is in the discretion of the
6
trial judge, the court adopted a balancing test, as prescribed in Stone v. Morris,'
to provide guidance to the judge in his determination. The eight factors which the
court should consider in making its determination of whether a prisoner should
appear at trial, as plaintiff or defendant, are: (1) the costs and inconvenience of
transportation; (2) any potential danger or security risk of the prisoner to the court;
(3) the substantiality of the matter at issue; (4) the need for an early determination
of the matter; (5) the possibility of delaying trial until the prisoner is released; (6)
the probability of success on the merits; (7) the integrity of the correctional system;
and (8) the interests of the prisoner in presenting his testimony in person rather
than deposition.' 7 In adopting the Stone v. Morris test, the court did not discuss
whether any particular weight should be given to the individual factors.
The second of the two cases defining rights of persons is custody, Cronauer
v. State" involved the appeal of Betty Ann Cronauer from a trial court's order
denying the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant was seeking habeas corpus relief from her arrest and custody pursuant to a warrant upon requisition (rendition warrant) issued by the Governor of West Virginia in response
to a request by the Governor of California for the appellant's extradition to that
State. Cronauer had been charged in California with violating a child custody statute.
The controversy began in 1980 in North Carolina when the appellant was apCraigo, 331 S.E.2d at 513-14; see W. VA. CODE § 28-5-33 (Supp. 1985).
IId. at 513.
14

Id. at 513-14.

11 Id. at 514.
,6Id. at 555 (citing Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976)).
" Craigo, 331 S.E.2d at 515.
" Cronauer, 322 S.E.2d 862.
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pointed by a North Carolina court as guardian for the estate of her deceased husband's five children. Soon after, a half sister of the children removed them to
California and a year later was appointed full guardian of the five children by
a California superior court.
Shortly before this last appointment, the appellant had removed two of the
children from California and transported them back to North Carolina. A warrant
was issued in California for the appellant's arrest and, although the State of North
Carolina refused to extradite her to California, a North Carolina court ordered
her to return the two children to the custody of their half sister. She complied,
9
and her guardianship over the estates of the five children was terminated." In late
1981, the appellant was arrested in West Virginia on a fugitive from justice warrant and released on bond. She was later recommitted to jail for sixty days and
20
her bond forfeited pursuant to West Virginia Code section 5-1-9(h). In August,
1982, the Governor of West Virginia issued a rendition warrant for the appellant's
arrest in response to a request of extradition from the Governor of California and
in September, 1982, the appellant was arrested again. 2
The appellant thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Clay County pursuant to West Virginia Code section 5-1-9.22 She
alleged that her arrest and confinement in the county jail was illegal because the
face of the extradition documents issued by the Governor of West Virginia and
the Governor of California did not clearly charge that a crime had been committed
under California law. The trial court denied the petition but stayed the extradition23
of the appellant pending a decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
found that the rendition warrant issued by the Governor of West Virginia complied with the mandates of the governing statute."' The court also declared that
a circuit court, when determining the sufficiency of a rendition warrant in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging the validity of custody in connection with extradition proceedings, may examine underlying documents filed by the demanding state
in support of its request for extradition. 5
The court discussed the statutory requirements governing the extradition process, noting that numerous written documents are required. 6 It had previously held
that the procedures required of the demanding state must comply with the "clear
27
and unambiguous" language of the authorizing statute or extradition will be denied.

11 Id. at 864.

:0 Id. at 864-65. See W. VA. CoDE § 5-1-9(h) (1979).
21 Cronauer, 322
22

z'
24

S.E.2d at 864-65.

Id. at 865. See W. VA. CODE § 5-1-9 (1979).
Cronauer, 322 S.E.2d at 864-65.
Id. at 868. See W. VA. CODE § 5-1-8(a) (1979).

2' Cronauer, 322 S.E.2d at 868.
26 Id.

1, see, Locke v. Burns, 160 W. Va. 753, 238 S,E.2d 536 (1977).
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The request for extradition from the demanding state must also include an "affidavit or sworn evidence that the demand or application is made in good faith
for the punishment of crime .

...28 Finally, if the Governor decided that the

demand should be complied with, he could issue a warrant of arrest which must
substantially recite facts supporting its validity. 29 The court found that all these
conditions had been satisfied. It reasoned that the statement contained in the rendition warrant that the appellant "stands charged with the crime of violation of
a child custody order" gave reasonable notice to the appellant of the nature of
the crime charged in California.30 This met the demand that the warrant "substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance. ' 3 The court then
referred to supporting documents accompanying the rendition warrant which set
out in detail the specificity of the crime as further evidence that the appellant was
aware of the crime with which she was charged. The court looked to the statutes
of other jurisdictions and determined that the language in the rendition warrant
was well within the standards adopted by states with similar statutes.32 The court
concluded, after cursory discussion, that it is a well-settled rule that "the underlying documents may be examined to see if they can serve as a valid basis for a
governor's rendition warrant." 33

II.

BAIL REVOCATION

Marshall v. Casey, 324 S.E.2d 346 (W. Va. 1984).
Marshallv. Casey" addressed procedural protection due an accused during bail
revocation proceedings. In an action for habeas corpus and mandamus, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied the relief sought by the petitioner due
to a technicality, but affirmatively settled the procedural question of the necessity
of a hearing and the requirement of stated reasons for the granting or denial of
bail revocation.
In Marshall, the petitioner sought relief from the revocation of his bail in the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County. 35 The petitioner had been indicted for the felony
offenses of sexual assault and burglary and was subsequently released upon bail.
During his release, the petitioner was arrested for the misdemeanor offense of
trespassing and a magistrate set the bail at $5,000 "cash only". On the day of
his arrest for trespassing, the prosecutor filed a written motion to the circuit court

28

Cronauer, 322 S.E.2d at 867. See W. VA. CODE § 5-1-7(b) (1979).

29

Cronauer, 322 S.E.2d at 867.

30 Id. at
'

868.
Id. See W. VA. CODE § 5-1-8(a) (1979).
Cronauer, 322 S.E.2d at 867-68.
I at 868.
Id.
Marshall v. Casey, 324 S.E.2d 346 (W. Va. 1984).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/14
Id. at 346-47.
"
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to revoke the petitioner's bail upon the sexual assault and burglary charges. Circuit
Judge Casey granted the motion and issued a capias for the petitioner's incarceration. The court's order was based solely upon the prosecutor's unverified and undocumented motion. A hearing was scheduled by the respondent to take place nine
days later, but was never held due to the inability of the petitioner's counsel to
36
attend. No hearing was rescheduled by the petitioner's counsel.
Although the defendant had subsequently been incarcerated pursuant to a guilty
plea on the initial charges, the court refused to find the question moot, on the
grounds that "here was a question capable of repetition and yet would evade
' The court discussed generally the constitutional and statutory
review." 37
provisions
relating to the granting and denial of bail and emphasized the importance of developing methods to safeguard the rights of accused in bail matters.38
The court held that Rule 46(h) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to bail determination hearings, is compatible with the principle
of due process applicable to bail revocation proceedings and that an accused whose
bail is revoked may, by motion, challenge revocation. A hearing upon the motion
must be provided." 9 In this case however, the writs were denied because the petitioner failed to pursue the matter in circuit court after the scheduled hearing had
been cancelled due to the fault of petitioner's counsel.40 The court, in effect, ruled
that the petitioner had waived his right to another hearing by his failure to reschedule
such hearing.
In concluding, the court did not specifically address the question of whether
the scheduling of the first hearing nine days after the revocation of the petitioner's
bail was in accordance with due process, although reference was made to the "fiveday requirement" of Rule 46(h).4 1 The court's decision did, however, clarify any
questions which prosecutors and judges alike may have with respect to the proper
procedural protections to be afforded the accused in bail revocation proceedings.
III.

JUVENILES

Burdette v. Lobban, 323 S.E.2d 601 (W. Va. 1984).
In re Mark E.P., 331 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Ellsworth, 331 S.E.2d 503 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Highland, 327 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1984).

36

Id. at 347.

Id. at 347 n.4 (citing State ex rel. M.C.H. v. Kinder, 317 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1984)).
Id. at 348, see also U.S. CONST. AMEND III; W. VA. CONST., Art. III § 5.
" Marshall, 324 S.E.2d at 351; see W. VA. R. Cgau.
P. 46.
,0 Marshall, 324 S.E.2d at 352.
"
"

41

Id.
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State v. Howerton, 329 S.E.2d 874 (W. Va. 1985).
In five recent decisions, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed
issues which should affect the treatment of juvenile witnesses and offenders alike.
Four of the cases, State v. Highland,42 State v. Howerton 3 In re Mark E.P.,"
and State v. Ellsworth15 dealt principally with the issue of when a juvenile offender
may be transferred to criminal jurisdiction. A fifth decision, Burdette v. Lobban,4
should clarify any misunderstanding which may have existed as to whether a juvenile
victim of sexual abuse could be interrogated by defense counsel in the absence of
a court-appointed attorney. These decisions reflect the court's increasing concern
for the protection of the rights of juveniles at every stage of criminal proceedings.
In Burdette v. Lobban,47 a five-year-old girl was the alleged victim of sexual
abuse inflicted by her father. 8 The petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of an order by the circuit court permitting the child to be
interrogated by defense counsel outside the presence of her attorney.
In awarding the writ, the court cited the clear language of the child abuse statute
which provides that a child in a neglect or abuse proceeding shall have the right
to be represented by counsel "at every stage of the proceedings." 49 In support of
its decision, the court relied on a previous holding that, in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, an immature minor is incapable of waiving his or her right to counsel
except upon the advice of counsel. 5 The court expressed the concern that the fiveyear-old had undergone a horrifying experience already and deserved the protection of the court against the pressures which a defense attorney may consciously
or unconsciously exert.'
The court next addressed the issue of the competency of the testimony of a
five-year-old. To resolve this problem, the court decided that a neutral child
psychologist or psychiatrist should be appointed to inquire into the child's capacity.
The court recognized that the child could not be forced to be interviewed by the
psychiatrist or psychologist alone unless both the court and the guardian ad litem
agree. In the absence of an interview, the court may refuse to allow the child to
be a witness when there is no assurance of competency. 2
, State v. Highland, 327 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1985).
' State v. Howerton, 329 S.E.2d 874 (W. Va. 1985).
" In re Mark E.P., 331 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1985).
' State v. Ellsworth, 331 S.E.2d 503 (W. Va. 1985).
Burdette v. Lobban, 323 S.E.2d 601 (W. Va. 1984).
47

Id.

I at 602.
ld.
Id. at 602-03 (citing W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(a) (1984), which reads in part, "In any proceeding
under the provisions of this article, the child, ...
shall have the right to be represented by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings").
o Burdette, 323 S.E.2d at 603 (citing State exrel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981)).
Burdette, 323 S.E.2d at 603.
49

52 Id.
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In State v. Highland,5 3 the petitioner sought a reversal of a final sentencing
and transfer order by the Circuit Court of Taylor County. The petitioner had pleaded
guilty to burglary and arson charges and had been sentenced to the West Virginia
Penitentiary. As a juvenile, the petitioner was committed to the custody of the
commissioner of corrections for confinement in a juvenile institution until he was
eighteen.
As the petitioner's eighteenth birthday neared, the circuit court on its own
motion held a dispositional hearing to determine whether the petitioner should be
transferred from the juvenile facility to the state penitentiary. Against the recommendation of the commissioner of corrections that the petitioner should be released,
the circuit court ordered the petitioner transferred to the Huttonsville Correctional
Center to serve the remainder of his sentence."'
In reversing the order of the circuit court, the supreme court held that the
proper statutory prerequisites had not been followed. 5 The primary issue centered
upon the language of West Virginia Code section 49-5-16(b) which authorizes a
transfer "if, in the judgment of the commissioner of the department of corrections
-16
and the court which committed such child, such transfer is appropriate ....
The court rejected the argument of the State that the court alone had final discretion as to when a transfer to an adult facility is permitted and ruled, instead, that
both the commissioner of corrections and the court must agree before a transfer
is authorized. 7 Without the assent of both, no transfer is permitted under the statute.
In Highland, the court recognized that the Legislature imposed the hearing
and review procedure for a specific purpose-to examine any rehabilitative progress achieved by the youthful offender." Since the purpose of confining juveniles
is rehabilitation, not punishment, the findings and recommendations of the juvenile
treatment authorities should be given substantial weight in any transfer proceeding.
The court concluded by discussing the four prerequisites to a lawful transfer of
an individual from a juvenile facility to an adult institution. These are: "(1) the
transferee must be at least eighteen years of age; (2) the sentencing court must
deem the transfer appropriate; (3) the Commissioner of Corrections must deem
the transfer appropriate; and (4) a hearing must be held by the sentencing court
prior to the approved transfer to consider modification of the originally imposed
sentence."" As noted above, the third requirement was not met in this case,
therefore, requiring a reversal.
Highland, 327 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1984).
' Id. at 705.

" Id. at 708.
56 See W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(b) (Supp. 1985) (authorizing a transfer, "If, in the judgment of
the commissioner of the department of corrections and the court which committed such child, such

transfer is appropriate. .. ").
" Highland, 327 S.E.2d at 707; W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10(b) (Supp. 1984). The State contended
that final proviso for pre-transfer hearing left all decisions under entire section be left to discretion of court.
"

Highland, 327 S.E.2d at 707.

Id. at 708.
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State v. Howerton60 also involved the issue of transfer to criminal jurisdiction
and, in addition, presented a unique question concerning the admissability of outof-court statements. James Ronald Howerton was convicted of second degree murder
when he was seventeen years old. He was transferred from juvenile jurisdiction
to adult criminal jurisdiction upon a finding by the trial court that probable cause
existed to believe that he had committed a murder. The defendant did not exercise
his right to a direct statutory appeal at the time of the transfer. In his appeal to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the defendant challenged the validity
of his transfer on the ground that the trial court failed to make adequate findings
of fact and law, and, in addition, the defendant assigned five errors seeking reversal of his criminal conviction.' The transfer decision and two of the assignments
of error will be discussed below.
The court summarily disposed of the transfer issue relying on West Virginia
Code section 49-5-10(f).62 This statute provides that notice of intent to appeal and

a request for a transcript must be filed within ten days from entry of a transfer
order. It also requires that a petition for appeal must be presented to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals within forty-five days from entry of the transfer
order, or the right of appeal and the right to object to the transfer order shall
be waived and may not thereafter be asserted. Since the language of the statute
was clear, the court had no trouble in denying the defendant's appeal. This ruling
is consistent with other jurisdictions' views concerning the right of a defendant
to appeal a transfer from juvenile to adult jurisdiction.
One of the defendant's principle assignments of error involved the admission
of his oral confession which was given to a Huntington police officer while he
was in custody. He asserted that the statement was admitted in violation of a prolaw dealing with the admissibility of extrajudicial statements
vision of the juvenile
63
by juveniles.
The seventeen-year-old juvenile, in response to a phone call from a Huntington
police officer, was brought to the juvenile unit of the police department by his
parents and was subsequently advised that he was being placed under arrest. After
64
being read his Mirandarights, the defendant confessed his involvement in a murder.
This evidence undoubtedly bore heavily on his later conviction.
On appeal, the defendant maintained that the evidence should have been suppressed in accordance with West Virginia Code section 49-5-1(d), 6s which provides:
"extra judicial statements other than res gestae statements by a child under sixteen

Howerton, 329 S.E.2d 874.
Id. at 876.
62 Id. at 876-77. See W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10(f) (1980) (which requires notice of intent to appeal
within 10 days and required filing of petition within 45 days from entry of transfer order).
63 Howerton, 329 S.E.2d at 877.
60
63

61

Id.

11Id. at 877, citing W. VA. CODE § 49-5-1(d).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/14
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years of age, made to law enforcement officials or while the child is in custody
and outside the presence of the child's counsel shall not be admissible." The defendant interpreted the prepositional phrases "by a child" and "under sixteen years
of age" in the statute as modifying "res gestae statements" rather than "(e)xtra
judicial statements. ' 66 The court disagreed, stating that such a construction "would
lead to the absurd result of placing an evidentiary restriction on the admissibility
of res gestae statements based on the age of the declarant." 6' The court, while
briefly discussing the history of the statute, concluded that the provision was designed
to protect juveniles under the age of sixteen years while in custody and outside
the presence of the child's counsel 68 from making incriminating statements. Since
the defendant was seventeen years old at the time of his confession, the court held
that the lower court did not err in admitting his confession into evidence. A juvenile's
confession not subject to West Virginia Code section 49-5-1(d) must be closely
scrutinized under the totality of the circumstances. Defendant's confession was not
challenged under the totality rule.
The defendant's other assignment of error presented an interesting evidentiary
matter. The defendant claimed that the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting testimony concerning incriminating statements made by the defendant
while under the influence of sodium amytal. 9 This test was conducted by a
psychiatrist who administered the drug to the defendant at the direction of defense
counsel, and then reviewed the criminal episode with him. The interview was tape
recorded, and the defendant obtained a copy of the tape. The defendant later took
the tape to the home of an aquaintance and, in the presence of several people,
played it. The defendant made the comment that it was his truth serum tape.7"
One of the listeners testified at trial, over the defendant's objection, as to several
incriminating statements made on the tape. The tape itself was not introduced into
evidence.
The court disagreed with the trial judge's ruling that statements on the tape
were a tacit admission but nonetheless refused to find that reversible error had
been committed. Instead, the court held that the out-of-court statements by the
defendant and the subsequent voluntary playing of the tape amounted to an adoptive admission. 7 ' The court seemed to rely heavily on the facts that the defendant
by the witness
played the tape without prior urging, and that the statements recalled
2
bore a close relation to the physical evidence of the crime.

66 Hoiverton, 329 S.E.2d at 877.

at 877-78.
6' Id. at 878.
69 Id. at 879.
67 Id.

70

Id.

" Id. at 881.
72 Id. at 880-81.
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The final two cases, In re Mark E.P.7 1 and State v. Ellsworth,74 also concerned the admissability of confessions obtained from juveniles outside the presence
of counsel. Both of these cases followed the "totality of the circumstances" approach
in Howerton," and an in-depth discussion of the court's decisions would merely
result in repetition.
7
Howerton,7 Mark E.P.,79
In conclusion, these cases, Burdette,76 Highland,1
8
and Ellsworth" demonstrate the court's efforts to assure that juvenile offenders
and victims are given adequate protection in all phases of criminal proceedings.
These cases suggest that the court is becoming increasingly concerned with the
safeguards of due process for juveniles; that is, adequate representation by counsel
and opportunity for hearing at all stages of criminal proceedings.

IV.

VENUE

State v. Ginanni, 328 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 1984).
In State v. Ginanni,8' the court reaffirmed the guidelines set by the Legislature
regarding a defendant's right to a change of venue. In reversing the defendant's
conviction, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle
that there must be a showing of good cause to warrant a change of venue in a
criminal case, set constitutional parameters on what constitutes "good cause," and
reaffirmed a prior holding that the fact that a jury free from exception can be
impanelled is not conclusive, on a motion for a change of venue, that prejudice
does not exist and will not justify the court in refusing to receive other evidence
to support such a motion. 2
Robert Ginanni was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree. He had
previously been convicted of sexual assault. 3 The only error assigned on appeal
was the failure of the trial court to grant the appellant's motion for a change of
venue. The appellant asserted that the evidence presented at the hearing on his
motion to change venue was sufficient to show such a present hostile sentiment
against him that he could not receive a fair trial in Ritchie County. The State argued

In re Mark E.P., 331 S.E.2d 813.
Ellsworth, 331 S.E.2d 503.
7' Howerton, 329 S.E.2d 874.
76 Burdette, 323 S.E.2d 601.
77 Highland, 327 S.E.2d 703.
" Howerton, 329 S.E.2d 874.
7" In re Mark E.P.,-331 S.E.2d 813.
" Ellsworth, 331 S.E.2d 503.
"
State v. Ginanni, 328 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 1985) (per curiam).
Id. at 190 (citations omitted).
" Id.
at 189.
"
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and impartial jury was
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, that a fair
4
selected, and that the appellant was given a fair trial.1
At the hearing on the motion, the appellant presented twenty-one witnesses,
seventeen of which said his reputation was bad or questionable.8 5 Fourteen of the
witnesses also expressed their belief that a present hostile sentiment existed in the
community toward the appellant.
During the selection of the jury, all except one had either heard of the case
or prior cases concerning the appellant, or had heard of the appellant's bad reputation. In the middle of the voir dire, the defense counsel renewed the motion for
a change of venue. In denying the motion, the trial court stated: "Well, if we cannot pick a jury, it will certainly have to be transferred. I do not think that is
apparent, yet. .... 86
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the court restated the grounds
necessary for removal of a criminal trial to a county other than the one in which
the alleged offense was committed.8 7 Holding that only the accused is entitled to
change of venue upon petition and a showing of good cause, the court stated that
the fact that a jury free from exception can be impanelled is not conclusive that
the accused will receive a fair trial. 8 The court rejected the reasons of the trial
court for not granting a change of venue and found that the record disclosed evidence
of hostile sentiment beyond the appellant's home community.88 The court also stated
that the "good cause" must exist at the time application for a change of venue
is made.88
The court's decision reflects the fact that venue has lost the significance it
once had when jurors were primarily witnesses to the alleged offense, and thus,
it was necessary for a trial to be held in the community where the offense occurred.
Today, jurors are judges instead of witnesses and the present venue cases are gradually reflecting this change in roles.
C. Chilton Wise, III

1,Id. at 188.

at 188-89.

88

Id.

"

Id. at 189.

, Id. at 190 (citing State v. Pratt, 161 W. Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978) where the court defined
"good cause shown" as being proof that a defendant cannot get a fair trial in a county because of
extensive hostile sentiment). See also W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 14; W. VA. CODE § 62-3-13.
Ginanni, 328 S.E.2d at 190.
88 Id. The trial court's reasons were: (1) no witness had testified that appellant couldn't get a
fair trial, (2) evidence didn't show hostile sentiment outside the area, and (3) an impartial jury had
been selected in the appellant's previous trial.
11 Id. at 190.
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES

State v. Lambert, 331 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1985).
In State v. Lambert,9 ' the court heard an appeal from a man that had been
convicted of aiding in concealing stolen property. In one of the grounds on appeal,
Lloyd Lambert asked the court to reverse his conviction because the lower court
erred in admitting evidence the prosecution had failed to disclose as directed by
a court discovery order governed by Rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The evidence focused on statements that Lambert made to two witnesses.
In its discussion of the merits of this ground, the court pointed out that the
new West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, while being largely based on the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nevertheless differ in many respects. 92 Rule
16 of the West Virginia Rules considered in Lambert, varies substantially from
its federal counterpart. The supreme court, in determining the consequences of the
prosecutor's failure to abide by the rule, considered the variance between the two
rules and decided to apply precedent from cases decided prior to the adoption of
the new rules.9 3 Relying on State v. Grimm," the court found that, since Lambert
had been given ample opportunity to interview the witnesses and because an in
camera hearing was held prior to the trial where Lambert was apprised of the
testimony, he could not claim surprise by the testimony of the two witnesses. Consequently, no prejudice resulted, and no reversible error was committed."
The importance of this decision lies not in the court's substantive ruling, but
in the method of review utilized. By considering the new rules in light of cases
decided under the old rules, the court may well reach a different result than would
the federal courts operating under a similar set of rules for criminal procedure.
VI.

WAIVER OF COUNSEL

State v. Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1985).
In State v. Armstrong,96 the court discussed the ability of a trial court to use
prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for driving under the influence to
" State v. Lambert, 331 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1985). The court also discussed the application of
the One Term Rule to the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Following precedent, the court quickly
ruled that the Three Term Rule controlled here.
91 Id. at 878.
93 Id. at 878. W. Va. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(A), adopted in 1981, provides that a defendant may
discover on an order from the court all statements, made by him to any witness, which the prosecution

intends to offer as evidence at trial. Conversely, the federal rule governing this, Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a)(l)(A), allows only the discovery of such a statement when the defendant knew at the time it
was made that the person to whom he was speaking was an officer of the law.
14 State v. Grimm, 270 S.E.2d 173 (f. Va. 1980) (decided before the adoption of the new rules

in October 1981).
" Lambert, 331 S.E.2d at 878.

96 State v. Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1985).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/14

12

Wise and Darst: Criminal Procedure
SUR VEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

19851

enhance the sentence to be imposed on a defendant's conviction of a third offense."
The defendant appealed his third conviction, arguing that the court could not use
prior unrepresented convictions to impose a prison sentence. He also claimed he
98
had not properly waived his right to an attorney under the sixth amendment.
Relying on Baldasarv. Illinois,99 the court stated that prior misdemeanor convictions where no imprisonment could have been imposed may not later be used
to enhance a sentence of imprisonment, unless the individual was represented by
counsel or waived the right to counsel.'
This lead to the issue presented to the court of whether the defendant had
made a valid waiver of counsel in the previous cases. Following the United States
Supreme Court decision of Johnson v. Zerbst,'0 ' the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals stated that waiver of counsel can never be presumed.', 2 The record
must demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived such a fundamental right. The court also recognized, however, the
difficulties inherent in this requirement because of the economic problems associated
with preserving a record of minor court proceedings.' 3
Having set forth this premise, the court examined the evidence of this case.
The defendant suffered from mental retardation, although the court ruled that a
less than normal intelligence is not in and of itself conclusive to find an involuntary waiver." ' As to the first trial, the court noted that the defendant signed a
waiver of counsel form, albeit in the wrong place. The form was signed before
the defendant had an initial meeting with any attorney and the guilty plea taken
from the defendant was entered over a month after this waiver form was signed.
Nothing in the record of the first conviction indicated the defendant's waiver except this form.
Given these facts, the court held that while the signing of a waiver form was
primafacie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the presump5
tion may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.', The
particular circumstances of this case warranted a reversal because the court could
not find that the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel in the first conviction.' 6 As to the second conviction, the testimony of the magistrate who ac"7 W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2(i) (Supp. 1985) provides that while normally a conviction for a D.U.I.
charge carries only a fine, the third conviction arising from such a charge converts the penalty into
a felony, where a prison sentence is to be imposed.
9'

U.S. Co~sr. Amend. VI.

19 Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980). This case dealt with a sentence enhancement for a
second misdemeanor theft conviction, which was transformed into a felony by reason of a prior conviction.
Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d at 841.
,o' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d at 841.
,0' Id. at 841-42.
104

Id. at 842 (citing State v. Hamrick, 160 W. Va. 673, 236 S.E.2d 247 (1977)).

105Id.
116Id. at 843.
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cepted his plea indicated a waiver of counsel."0 7 This testimony supplemented a

waiver form that the defendant signed.
Armstron was a case of first impression in West Virginia, and the court followed
the United States Supreme Court holding in Baldasar.'°8 However, this may be
a restricted holding. First, the court indicated that magistrates were to be given
more leeway in preserving a record, thereby detracting from the requirements of
a clear showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. Second, the court
gives distinction to signed, pre-typed rights forms, holding that such forms are prima
facie evidence of voluntariness. This recognition is supported by precedent in West
Virginia,' 9 although support to the contrary has been indicated at the federal level." 0
Furthermore, whether a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently will be decided
on the particular facts of each case.
VII.

ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE

State v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Schofield, 331 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Perry, 324 S.E.2d 354 (W. Va. 1984).
State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).
During the survey period the court dealt with several aspects of search and
seizure. In one case, State v. Cook,"' the court considered the admissibility of
evidence seized in connection with a lawful arrest but without a search warrant.
Several men had robbed and murdered a man in West Virginia. They fled to
Cleveland, Ohio and attempted to transfer funds by using the victim's stolen
checkbook. As a result of this attempt, their whereabouts were discovered, and
Ohio authorities arrested them in their hotel room. When the police burst into the
room, they found the suspects sleeping. The suspects offered no resistance and
were immediately handcuffed. The police searched the area around the bed, and
after noticing some items on a dresser some distance away, one of the officers
107 Id.

-S Baldasar, 446 U.S. 222.
,"I See State ex rel. Powers v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 6. 138 S.E.2d 159 (1964); State ex rel.
Fountain v. King, 149 W. Va. 511, 142 S.E.2d 59 (1965). Both contain dialogue with the judge which
is clear from the record.
'10 In Carnely v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), the Court held that a mere statement in the
record that waiver of assistance of counsel was presumed, absent anything else, could never show an
intelligent waiver. Cf. Williford v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982) (where a question-answer form
had been incorporated into the record, this was sufficient to support the finding of an intelligent waiver
of counsel).
' State v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1985). Among other issues raised in his appeal, Cook
argued that his confession was involuntary, as he was mentally retarded and lacked the ability to make
such a waiver. The ourt disagreed, holding that voluntariness of a confession must be determined
from the totality of the circumstances and not solely on less than normal intelligence.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/14
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made a closer examination. His examination revealed the checkbook and address
book of the victim. This evidence was not taken by him but was actually seized
by another group of officers after the suspects had been removed from the area." 2
The defendant argued that the search was conducted without a warrant, and,
therefore, the evidence seized in that search was inadmissible. The court agreed
with him. Quoting from State v. Moore," 3 the court declared that extra-judicial
searches are "per se unreasonable," subject only to a few exceptions.' '" The court
held that the search was invalid, since it was conducted without a warrant."' Furthermore, the search did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the6
rule including a search incident to arrest or search under the plain view doctrine."
In order to fall within the exception of a search incident to arrest explained by
the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"7 the search must
be limited to the immediate geographic area around the arrestee, where he could
tamper with evidence or uncover weapons. Any items seized outside this area may
only be obtained through the issuance of a valid search warrant. Applying this
premise to the facts of this case, West Virginia's highest court noted that, since
the suspects were around the bed when they were arrested, a search of the dresser
was beyond the arrestee's area of control." 8 The unlawful search was further complicated by the fact that the actual seizure was accomplished by another group of
officers after the men were physically removed from the room and all possibility
of tampering was eliminated." 9 The court concluded that the police could have
secured the area while a search warrant was issued.' 20
In discussing the search incident to a lawful arrest exception, the court
simultaneously addressed the issue of whether the evidence could be admitted under
the plain view doctrine, another exception to the requirement of a search warrant.
Again the court relied on Coolidge, holding that a search of property in plain view
is permissible where the police have probable cause to believe the articles are evidence
of the crime. Also, the police must be acting within the law when the evidence
is observed.' 2 ' The checkbook and address book were not of an incriminating nature.
Nor did these items offer an element of ownership. Therefore, the search did not
meet the requirements of the plain view doctrine.'22 As a result of this analysis,
the evidence taken from the dresser was held inadmissable and the defendant's conviction was reversed.

"

Id. at 154-55.

"'

State v. Moore, 272 S.E.2d 804, 808 (W. Va. 1980).
Cook, 332 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 155.

116

Id.

119

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Cook, 332 S.E.2d at 155.
Id.

120

Id.

Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
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The court was not unaminous in its decision. Justice Brotherton dissented. 23
He stressed the fact that the police were well aware that the arrestees had tried
to use the victim's checkbook and knew of its importance in the case. Since the
officer immediately recognized an item on the dresser as a checkbook, he had enough
probable cause to make a closer investigation and seize the evidence. 2 4
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed its adherence to the
Coolidge plurality' 23 with regard to both of these issues. Even Justice Brotherton
spoke in terms of probable cause and geographical area. This view, however, appears contrary to a recent United State Supreme Court decision. In Texas v.
Brown, 2 6 the United States Supreme Court held that evidence does not have to
be immediately apparent in order to meet the requirements of the plain view doctrine. In fact, the Court initimated that something less than probable cause may
be acceptable in these types of searches, both in sharp contrast with Coolidge and
this case.
The West Virginia court discussed another important issue in this case. Mark
Price, a participant in the scheme, offered to testify at the appellant's trial. His
attorney, as well as the defendant's attorney, told the trial judge that the witness
would testify to two questions' and, thereafter, invoke his privilege against selfincrimination under the fifth amendment. The trial judge refused to allow this
testimony because the witness' refusal to be subjected to cross-examination would
prejudice the State's case. The defendant claimed that the trial court erred in not
permitting this witness to testify.
When a witness voluntarily testifies, the interests of the other party and the
function of the court to ascertain the truth interplay in determining the scope and
limits of the privilege against self-incrimination.' 28 The trial court failed to analyze
the extent of the proposed testimony and its fifth amendment implications. 2 9 In
analyzing these delicate matters the judge must balance three competing interests:
"the defendant's interest in presenting his or her own witnesses to establish a defense,
the witness' interest in exercising his or her privilege against self-incrimination, and
"I Id.
124

Id.

at 162 (Brotherton, J., dissenting).

"I Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443.
'26 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
'17The two questions were as follows:
Q. While the Jeep was parked at Hillcrest Drive, at any time did Roy Frye say, "I
think you are going to rob me?"

A.

No.

Q. Did Theodore Cook at any time other than initially helping Roy Frye out of the
Jeep vehicle ever grab, hold onto, or in any way restrain Roy Frye?
A. No.
Cook, 332 S.E.2d at 157.
2 Id. at 158. The court relied on Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958), which held that
a witness may not claim the fifth amendment privilege when she has testified on a topic. She is subject

to cross-examination.
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the prosecution's interest in securing effective cross-examination."' 30 The court suggested that an in camera hearing would provide a favorable atmosphere to explore
the interests of the parties, the exact nature of the testimony, and the extent to
which the witness sought to invoke his privilege.' 3 ' In the absence of such a hearing, the trial court ruling was in error.
The court was not in total agreement on the need in this case for detailed analysis
of the testimony and subsequent cross-examination. Justice Brotherton dissented
on this point also.' 32 He stated that since two attorneys had indicated that the
witness would give limited testimony, nothing further was required. He felt the
trial court had inquired as far as was necessary to rule on the issue. The inquiry
was, in his view, equivalent to an in camera inquiry.' 3 3
In State v. Schofield,'34 the court dealt with the validity of a warrantless arrest
of a suspect in her brother's home. Kathy Schofield was a suspect in the murder
of a man in West Virginia. After finding some incriminating evidence at her home
in Ohio, the West Virginia authorities issued a warrant, contacted the Ohio
authorities, and requested the suspect be arrested on a fugitive warrant. She was
to be held pending extradition. The warrant, however, was invalid since the
magistrate issued it solely on an officer's statement that "James Gill was shot to
death.""' The Ohio officials, acting in good faith, went to the home of the suspect's
brother. They were invited in by him and subsequently arrested Ms. Schofield. After
her conviction, the defendant challenged the legality of her arrest and the admission of her post arrest statement. She argued that her constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches
and seizures had been violated on the grounds that the war36
rant was invalid.'
In discussing the merits of her argument, the court agreed that the West Virginia
warrant was defective.' 3" But citing the case of United States v. Leon,' 3 the court
noted that the exclusionary rule may not apply where an officer acted in objective
reasonable reliance on a defective warrant issued by a magistrate.' 39 The court ruled,
however, that this issue need not be reached because the circumstances of Schofield
30

Id. at 159.

1' Id.
132

"

Id. at 162-64.
Id. at 163.

"' State v. Schofield, 331 S.E.2d 829 (W.Va. 1985). Two other issues raised in this case deserve
mentioning. The court held that it was "prima facie untimely" to raise the issue of competency to
stand trial on the day the trial is to begin. This follows the rule that a defendant may waive this right
unless raised in a reasonable time. Id. at 838. Also the court extended the rule set down in State v.
Beck, 286 S.E.2d 234 (W.Va. 1981), to potentially prejudicial photographs, holding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by not granting a mistrial on the grounds that jurors might have been
exposed to published photographs of the defendant. Schofield, 331 S.E.2d at 839.
" Id. at 833. The court stated that a magistrate could not merely be a "rubber stamp for the
police," but had to make an independent judgment based on probable cause. Id. at 834-35.
36 U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
Schofield, 331 S.E.2d at 835.
"'
United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).

Schofield, 331 S.E.2d at 835.
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indicated a valid warrantless arrest.'"" As the West Virginia court recognized
previously in State v. Taddler,'"1 fourth amendment rights are personal in nature.
Consequently, the defendant's rights were not infringed since she was arrested in
her brother's home, not her own. The court stated that she could not have had
a legitimate expectation of privacy while visiting.'" Even if her brother's rights
were infringed, his right of privacy could not be relied upon by Ms. Schofield.'"
The court was, however, not unanimous in its decision. Justice McGraw strongly
dissented.'" He argued that many of the ideas the majority relied on were only
applicable to exigent circumstances. The emphasis on the "home" had been abandoned in Katz v. United States.'"5 The proper test according to McGraw was a
two question analysis. "[F]irst, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'.'" To Justice McGraw a private dwelling
was sufficient to create this expectation, regardless of whose home it was.
The court in Schofield provided further refinement to the varying degrees of
intrusiveness of the privacy interest and the fourth amendment implications of such
intrustions."1
During the survey period, the court also considered the power of police officers to conduct inventory searches. In State v. Perry,'"' David Perry was pulled
over for a glaring head light and an expired license plate. Upon investigation, the
police officer discovered that the driver had no license or registration. After checking with police headquarters, the officer determined that the car was registered
to the driver, ruling out his belief that the car might be stolen. The officer, however,
informed Perry that he was charged with operating a vehicle without a license and
that his vehicle would be towed. The officer did not allow the driver to make alternative arrangements to have the car taken away. The officer also felt it necessary
to impound the car since he could not be sure the driver was the owner of the
vehicle. Subsequently, the police began a routine inventory search, which uncovered
a briefcase in the cab of the car. The officers opened the trunk and found some
marijuana. This evidence was used to convict the driver of possession of marijuana, and forfeiture proceedings were initiated.' 49
,,0 Id.
"' State v. Tadder, 313 S.E.2d 667 (W.Va. 1984). This case held that a passenger in an automobile
had no claim of privacy, since he had no property or possessory interest in the vehicle. He suffered
no invasion of any legitimate expectation of privacy.
,41
Schofield, 339 S.E.2d at 835.
,4 Id.
" Id. at 840 (McGraw, J., dissenting).

,,5Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

"4Schofield, 331 S.E.2d at 841 (McGraw, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
'14 Schofield, 331 S.E.2d at 836. See also State v. Peacher, 280 S.E.2d 559 (W.Va. 1981) (where
the court implicitly recognized varying degrees of intrusiveness).
''
State v. Perry, 324 S.E.2d 354 (W. Va. 1984).
, See W. VA. CODE § 60A-5-505(a)(4) (1984).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/14
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The defendant challenged the propriety of the search of the car on the ground
that the police did not give him an opportunity to make other arrangements for
'
the car's disposal. The court agreed, citing State v. Goff." The court held that
a proper impoundment was a prerequisite to a valid inventory search.' The court
then discussed several grounds for a valid impoundment. Relying on State v.
Shingleton, 15 2 the court said that (1) where the car is left unattended or is obstructing traffic, (2) where there has been an accident and the driver is incapable of
dealing with the vehicle, (3) when the car is abandoned or the owner is either
physically or mentally incapable of disposing of the car, (4) where the car has been
stolen or used in the commission of a crime, or (5) where an ordinance or statute
provides for forfeiture of the vehicle, a valid impoundment may take place. In
most of these situations, the owner or possessor will be unavailable or incapable
of making arrangements. The court, however, stated that where the driver is present and fully capable of disposing of the car, the police must give the driver a
53
reasonable opportunity to make other arrangements for the disposal of the vehicle.'
54
This may hold true even when the driver has been arrested.'
None of the Shingleton grounds were present in Perry. As a consequence, the
impoundment of the vehicle was improper. Therefore, any inventory search which
followed was not proper, and the evidence was inadmissible.
This decision defines the first part of a four-part test which prescribes the con15
ditions for a lawful inventory search as set forth in Goff. Goff represented West
6
Virginia's adaptation of South Dakota v. Opperman.' This decision may restrict the
must be given an oppordriver
the
since
conducted
searches
number of inventory
in
most cases. Police must
impoundment
to
arrangements
tunity to make alternative
vehicles. 57
impounding
routinely
of
instead
option
that
of
driver
the
now inform

110

Perry, 324 S.E.2d at 357. State v. Goff, 272 S.E.2d 457, 460 (W. Va. 1980), set down the

elements of a valid inventory search:
(1) there was an initial lawful impoundment of the vehicle;
(2) the driver was not present at the time of the impoundment to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings;
(3) the inventory itself was prompted by a number of valuables in plain view inside
the car; and
(4) there was no suggestion that the inventory search was a pretext for conducting
an investigative search.
"
Perry, 324 S.E.2d at 358.
352 State v. Singleton, 9 Wash. App. 327, 511 P.2d 1396 (1973). This case is cited in many jurisdictions in discussing the grounds for a valid impoundment.
"I Perry, 324 S.E.2d at 359.
"'

56

Id.

Goff, 272 S.E.2d at 460.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).

" In this case, the true reason for impoundment was that it was common practice for that police
department to impound a car when its driver was arrested for a misdemeanor traffic violation.
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In State v. Joseph T.,' 56 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dealt
with the issue of a search and seizure in the public school setting. In this case,
school officials determined that a student had been drinking beer before school
at the defendant's house. The assistant principal directed that the defendant's locker
be searched for alcoholic beverages. While no beer was found in the locker, some
wooden pipes and wrapping papers were discovered in the defendant's jacket pockets,
suggesting that the locker contained marijuana. These items were left in place and
the locker was closed until the principal returned with the student and a more detailed
search was carried out. Marijuana was discovered in the locker and admitted into
evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings. On appeal, the defendant claimed
that the search was not valid, and the evidence was, therefore, not admissible.
The court disagreed holding that a warrant was not required in a search at
school where the school official had a reasonable suspicion that the search would
turn up evidence of a violation of school regulations. 9 Holding that probable cause
was not necessary to justify a search by a school authority, the court relied heavily
on a recent United States Supreme Court decision, New Jersey v. T.L.O. 160 The
court stated that due to special needs of authorities in public schools, school officials must not be held to the same standards as police officers.' 61 An educator
will not be held to a probable cause standard, but he must have a "reasonable
suspicion" that the search will produce incriminating evidence in order to initiate
a warrantless search. The court continued by stating that the reasonable suspicion
standard, while not as strict as probable cause, was still limited by the requirement
that the official needed an initial justification for the search. Similarly, the extent
of the search was limited by this reasonable suspicion.
Applying these principles to Joseph T., the court found that, while the assistant principal may not have had sufficient probable cause to search the locker,
his belief that there might be alcohol in the locker based on information from the
defendant's companion gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant violated
school rules.' 6' The extent of the search was not excessively intrusive inasmuch
as the items uncovered gave rise to a suspicion that the locker contained marijuana.
Joseph T. brings West Virginia firmly in line with T.L.O. 63 Consequently,
the court adopted a more lenient standard for a warrantless search with regard
"' State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985). Justice McGraw's dissenting opinion, filed
Oct. 24, 1985, and Chief Justice Miller's concurring and dissenting opinion, filed Nov. 8, 1985, are
not discussed in this Survey.
Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d at 737-38.
36
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). In determining that lockers came within this
rule, the court seemed to rely on Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F.2d 470
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
161 Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d at 736.
162 Id. The court likened a search of the pockets of a jacket to the search of different compartments of a purse, which was held to be within the limits of the search in T.L.O.
,63 T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733.
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to school officials. However, the search must still be within the reasonableness inquiry set down by Terry v. Ohio.'64

VIII.

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION IN TRIALS

State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1985).
In State v. Franklin,' 5 the court dealt with the warrantless arrest of an individual and with prejudicial participation of the public in a trial. Larry Dale
Franklin was involved in an auto accident in which he received only minor cuts,
but where the other driver had been killed. Franklin was taken to the hospital and
treated. A police officer was dispatched to the hospital, and he arrested Franklin
for driving under the influence, resulting in death.'16 The arresting officer was not
the officer that had investigated the accident, but he based his arrest on Mr.
Franklin's demeanor, the smell of alcohol on Franklin's breath, and the fact that
he knew that Franklin was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. Franklin
67
challenged the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest.'
The court found that the arrest was proper. Noting the unusual circumstances
of the offense charged against the defendant and that the offense could be either
a misdemeanor or a felony, the court held that the police officer could make a
lawful, warrantless arrest based on probable cause. 6 8 Furthermore, the court held
that the arresting officer need not be the same person that investigated the accident. " 9 Another officer may make the arrest at the hospital, when the suspect has
been taken from the scene of the accident. The court held that ample probable
cause existed to make a valid arrest.
This case is an extention of State v. Byers,'70 the first West Virginia case to
address the question of an arrest for the subject offense. Under Byers, the officer
making the arrest does not have to be the same officer who investigated the accident, assuming of course that probable cause exists. The question may arise,
however, over whether the arresting officer may rely solely on information given
to him by the investigating officer, or whether he must have other independant
evidence to justify the arrest. This case included evidence that the arrestee could

,'Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A frisk search could only be conducted when 1) the search
was justified, and 2) the scope of the search was reasonably related to its original purpose.
'' State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1985).
166 See W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 (1981).
16, The warrantless arrest issue was the threshold question to the appellant's first assignment of
error, that being the trial court's refusal to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test. The court
went on to find that the test was admissible.
"' Franklin, 327 S.E.2d at 452-53.
169

Id.

"

State v. Byers, 159 W. Va. 596, 224 S.E.2d 726 (1976).
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have been drinking, but the court did not elaborate on what elements must be present before sufficient probable cause exists.
Another important aspect of this case is the claim by the appellant that he
was denied a right to a fair trial because obviously hostile spectators had influenced
the jury. Before and during the trial, the sheriff and members of the organization
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers " ' had been actively compaigning in the courthouse
lobby. Several members sat in front of the jury prominantly displaying buttons
espousing their cause. They were very orderly, and no demonstrations took place.
The court held that it was likely that the jury was pressured by this strong,
albeit silent, showing of force.' 72 Franklin's conviction was reversed. The court
found that such a blatant showing, where the participants were clearly distinguishable
from other members of the public, could be a strong psychological influence on
the jury. The court distinguished this case from State v. Richey,'" recognizing that
in Richey the spectators were not distinguishable from the general public which
has a right to attend criminal trials. In this case, lapel buttons were openly visible
and the jury was aware of their meanings. Consequently, there was a clear likelihood
that irreparable damage to the appellant's right to a fair trial occurred.
This decision brings West Virginia in line with other state court rulings on prejudicial public participation. However, the extent to which the public may participate is left open by Franklin.This case dealt with one extreme, that being intensive lobbying for a conviction. Richey, on the other hand, involved the reverse
condition. The participants were barely distinguishable from the general public.
Undoubtedly, further litigation will occur to distinguish more clearly the lines between prejudicial and non-prejudicial public participation.
IX.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

State v. Samples, 328 S.E.2d 191 (W. Va. 1985).
In State v. Samples,' 4 the court considered a defendant's right to counsel during interrogation. The appellant had been arrested by the police and had voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights. After the waiver, he confessed to the murder of his
step-brother and the step-brother's wife. He also claimed that he had shot at another

,7, Mothers Against Drunk Drivers is referred to as M.A.D.D.
Franklin, 327 S.E.2d at 455.
'"
State v. Richey, 298 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1982). The trial in this case involved the sexual abuse
of a teenage page at the state capitol. During the trial, several teenagers were present. They were not
distinguishable from other members of the public.
"' State v. Samples, 328 S.E.2d 191 (W. Va. 1985). The court also held that the failure of the

prosecutor to comply with a court ordered discovery of a statement the defendant had made, was fatal
to the state's case as it prejudiced the defendant's case.
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person on a prior occasion. Counsel was appointed for the charges in the murder
of his step-brother and wife. He was sent to Weston State Hospital for psychiatric
testing and remained there for eighteen days. Later that month, a police officer
questioned the defendant concerning his statement about shooting at someone else.
During this interrogation, Mr. Samples said that he was not really crazy, but he
was just putting on an act for the doctors in Weston. This statement was admitted
into evidence at trial, which greatly damaged the defendant's sole defense, insanity. The appellant contended that the lower court erred in admitting the evidence
because the questioning was done outside the presence of his counsel and no Miranda
warning was given to him before the interrogation began. Furthermore, the State
failed to disclose the second interview despite a general discovery order.
The court agreed, holding that counsel appointed for another offense need not
be present at the questioning of a defendant on an unrelated offense; nevertheless,
the defendant must be read his Miranda warnings before interrogation on the
unrelated charge. 75The court held that they could not find that an intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel had taken place. Relying on State v. Clawson,1 76 the court
indicated that a waiver could never be assumed merely because the individual being
questioned had previously waived the right to counsel on a separate charge. Each
waiver must be independantly made to insure an informed decision concerning waiver
of counsel in every case.

X.

SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT

Turner v. Holland, 332 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1985).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed an issue that had not
been considered prior to Turner v. Holland. 77 The court dealt with the trial court's
power to enhance the sentences on two offenses arising from one criminal transaction by two five-year enhancements (a five-year enhancement on each offense) based
on a prior felony.
In this case, the defendant had been convicted of a sexual abuse and burglary
charge. Both of these offenses arose out of one continuous criminal transaction.
Since the appellant had been previously convicted of a felony, the trial judge added
five years to both the sexual assault and burglary sentences.1 8
"'

Id.

176

State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1980). This case dealt with a defendant who had

at 194.

retained counsel on an unrelated charge. The court stated that that fact bore no relationship to whether

the defendant might have waived counsel on the present charge.
Turner v. Holland, 332 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1985).
W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1984) provides "[T]hat [if] such person had been before conW'
victed in the United States of a crime punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary, the court shall,
'"

if the sentence to be imposed is for a definite term of years, add five years to the time for which
the person is or would be otherwise sentenced. Whenever in such case the court imposes an indeter-
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The court held that this was improper. Relying on other cases interpreting the
recidivist statute,' 79 the court held that, for the purposes of the statute, two offenses committed during the same transaction were to be treated as one. 8 ' Absent
any specific language in the statute, the court must construe the statute against
the State."' Therefore, an enhancement could only be imposed on one of the present sentences arising from a single criminal event. This error was corrected by merely
ordering the trial court to remove one of the enhancements on the prison term,
rather than reversing the lower court's ruling.

XI.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

State v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Schofield, 331 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1985).
This discussion provides opportunity to compare and contrast the West Virginia
court's instructions regarding life with mercy and life without mercy. In State v.
Cook,"' the appellant contended that the jury was mislead by an instruction that
if he were convicted of life with a recommendation of mercy, he would be eligible
for consideration for parole only after a minimum ten year sentence. '", He argued
that the jury might believe he would be entitled to parole immediately after the
ten year period based upon remarks of the prosecution in closing argument.
The court, relying on State v. Lindsey," 4 recognized that the jury is to base
its decision on the facts of the case and not on the possibility of parole; nevertheless, it was the mandatory duty of the trial court to instruct the jury about the
possibility of parole.' 5 The court distinguished this case from others on which the
appellant relied by noting that the trial court emphasized that "such eligibility in
no way guarante[ed] immediate release."" ' 6 This case follows precedent in West

minate sentence, five years shall be added to the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise provided
for under such sentence."
'" State v. McMannis, 161 W. Va. 437, 242 S.E.2d 571 (1978). This case dealt with a different
issue. Here the defendant had committed a second offense, before his conviction on the first. The
court held that the statute was not applicable, since he had not been convicted of a prior felony.
"' Turner, 332 S.E.2d at 166.
"'
Id.
2 State v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1985).
"
Id. at 161. The trial court instructed the jury that he "would be eligible for consideration
for parole only after having served a minimum of ten (10) years of such sentence, such eligibility in
no way guaranteeing immediate release."
'"
State v. Lindsey, 160 W. Va. 284, 233 S.E.2d 734 (1977).
Cook, 332 S.E.2d at 160.
186 Id.
at 161, included instructions which stated that the defendant would be entitled to or subject
to parole. State v. Headley, 282 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1981) overturned aconviction of life without
mercy because the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant would be eligible for parole if
the jury returned a verdict of life with mercy.
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Virginia and parallels many other jurisdictions. West Virginia, however, views the
mention of parole as a mandatory instruction, while other jurisdictions may only
allow it in the discretion of the trial judge.
In a related issue regarding instructions, the court dealt with the lower court's
instruction to the jury regarding both life without mercy and a sentence with recommendation of mercy. In State v. Schofield,'8 7 the appellant claimed that the jury
did not understand the gravity of her sentence. She contended that the jury believed that she would be eligible for parole at sometime later than ten years after
her incarceration based upon the court's instructions which explained recommendation of mercy. The jury, she claimed, did not understand that she would never
go free.
At the trial her attorney did not object to this instruction. The court, therefore,
8
held that appellant was precluded from raising this issue on appeal.' However,
the court continued to discuss the issue. It was noted that a first degree murder
defendant is entitled to an instruction on the interrelationship between a recommendation of mercy and parole. The instruction given was not a misstatement of
the law, nor was it misleading. Therefore, the lower court had not committed an
error so egregious as to impair justice. 89 The court has taken two divergent though
maybe not inconsistent views on the subject, mandating the mention of parole when
recommending mercy, while not requiring the mention of a lack of parole when
instructing about life without mercy.
Brian A. Darst

"'
State v. Schofield, 331 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1985).
,s Id. at 840. The court's instruction read as follows:
Should you find the Defendant guilty of first degree murder without recommendation of
mercy, she will be sentenced to prison for life. Should you find the defendant guilty of first
degree murder with a recommendation of mercy, she must serve ten years in prison before
she first becomes eligible for parole, which may or may not be awarded then or at a later

date ....

Id. at 839.
"I Id. at 840.
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